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Abstract: 
This paper is a cross-national panel study evaluating how education-, health- and political 
dimensions of gender equality are affected by the size and composition of the female labor 
market. The hypothesis is that improving labor force participation and female employment in 
the service sector have a positive relationship with the dimensions of gender equality. Gender 
equality is measured using three sub-indices from the Global Gender Gap Index by World 
Economic Forum. The sub-indices are; Educational Attainment, Health and Survivability and 
Political Empowerment. The hypothesis is tested by using both a time-averaged-Ordinary 
least squares regression and a fixed effects estimation. The results of this paper confirm that, 
on an international level, service employment is positive for educational attainment, but no 
evidence was found regarding labor force participation. The result also suggests that the 
effect of increasing service employment is positive with diminishing marginal returns. There 
are some evidence of service employment having a positive relationship with health and 
survivability, but no evidence for the labor force participation. No evidence of an effect on 
political empowerment from neither labor force participation nor service employment was 
found, but further research using better data or methods will be needed to conclude these 
results. 
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1 Introduction  
“Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a 
peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world.” (United Nations, 2015).  
 
The fact that gender equality is an important contributor to economic growth, reducing 
poverty and increasing democracy has been long known. In a paper by Eastin & Prakash 
(2013) they found that economic development and gender equality had a positive relationship. 
However, in their conclusion they encouraged further research to focus on how different 
sources of economic growth affect gender equality. When researching gender equality, three 
issues need be addressed. First, defining what gender equality is. Second, finding appropriate 
ways of measuring it. Third, is to find effective means of improving it. The Oxford Dictionary 
(n.d.) defines gender equality as “The state in which access to rights or opportunities is 
unaffected by gender.”. The measuring of gender equality is sometimes made by looking at 
female to male ratios, such as wages, school enrolment or political representation. (e.g. Eastin 
& Prakash, 2013). Another common approach is using indices consisting of several 
dimensions of gender equality; such as the Gender Development Index by the United Nations 
Development Program, or the Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum. In such 
indices, gaps in gender equality can be identified.  
 
In the Gender Gap Report 2017, in which the Gender Gap Index is published, it is estimated 
that the gap between men and women won’t be closed for another 99 years if current pace of 
development is not accelerated (World Economic Forum, 2017). To increase gender equality, 
different approaches has been used. Increasing the school enrolment of girls and increasing 
the access to healthcare are, among others, advocated by the United Nations in their 17 
Sustainable Development Goals of Agenda 2030 (United Nations, 2015). Several countries, 
e.g. Brazil, Indonesia and Kenya, has also introduced gender quotas in parliament (Dahlerup, 
Hilal, Kalandadze & Kandawasvika-Nhundu, 2013). Currently, most reforms towards gender 
equality is aimed at including women in the labor market, with giving access to credit being a 
close second (World Bank, 2018a). As of 2017, women only make up about 39.3 % of the 
world's total labor force, and in low and middle-income countries it is still a bit lower, at 38.3 
%. These figures have barely changed at all since 1990, when the data was first collected at 
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this level (World Bank, 2018b). In support of this trend in reforms, some studies have found a 
relationship between different measures of gender equality and female labor force 
participation. 
1.1 Research question and contribution 
The research question of this paper is: Does the size and composition of the female labor 
market affect educational-, health- and political dimensions of gender equality? The 
dimensions are measured by using three sub-indices of the Global Gender Gap Index 
produced by World Economic Forum (2016); Educational Attainment, Health and Survival 
and Political Empowerment. The size of the female labor market is defined as the female 
labor force participation rate, and the composition of the female labor market is defined as 
employment in three labor market sectors; service, agriculture and industry, of which service 
sector employment will be compared to the others. To the best of our knowledge there has not 
been any prior study that specifically have researched the size and composition of the female 
labor market’s connection to gender equality, this paper intends to provide a panel study 
analyzing this matter. 
1.2 Structure 
The rest of this paper goes as follows; the rest of section 1 consists of a literature review and 
further research. Section 2 present the theoretical framework, section 3 the data, section 4 the 
empirical strategy, section 5 the results and discussion, and section 6 the conclusion. 
1.3 Literature review 
Iversen & Rosenbluth (2005) studied how labor market structures affect gender norms, 
measured as men’s partner preferences using survey data from Buss (1989). Partner 
preferences were measured as importance of virginity, cooking and housekeeping skills, and 
desire for home and children. They found a significant negative relationship between men’s 
partner preferences and service sector. When the service sector grows, virginity, cooking and 
housekeeping skills, and desire for home and children all become less important. The 
explanation, according to the authors, is that the service sector demand female labor which in 
turn improves women’s economic chances. Although closely related to this paper’s research 
question, Iversen and Rosenbluth’s (2005) study has some shortcomings. According to Buss 
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(1989), sampling techniques vary across countries, from interviews with high school students 
to newspaper advertisement and couples surveyed when applying for marriage licenses.  
 
Jensen (2010) observed that increased labor market opportunities influenced marriage and 
fertility decisions of women. The study was conducted on randomly selected rural villages in 
India. The treatment group of villages were provided with recruitment services to help young 
women get hired by the emerging business process outsourcing industry. The author found an 
increase in employment and enrolment in post-school training courses, and a decrease in 
marriage and fertility for women aged 18-24. Both school enrolment and BMI (Body Mass 
Index) increased for school-aged girls. At the same time, no evidence of a change because of 
the treatment were found for school-aged boys or working-aged men. Munshi & Rosenzweig 
(2006) investigated how the rise of the service and software industries in India during the 
1990s increased labor market opportunities for women previously outside of the labor market. 
Because of better returns on education in English, school-aged children’s education in English 
rose. Among the lower castes, girls’ English based education improved faster than for boys. 
They concluded that the reason for girls benefitting more in the lower castes was that they 
previously had not benefit from their caste-network in finding work, thus taking full 
advantage of the new situation by learning English. In another study by Iversen & Rosenbluth 
(2008) they studied the effect of increased female labor force participation on political 
representation. In some countries there was a strong correlation between increasing workforce 
participation and political representation, in other countries the correlation was much weaker, 
making the effect hard to distinguish. Their theory for the cause of this gender gap is that 
“when jobs require uninterrupted tenures, long hours, and inflexible schedules, women are at 
a distinct disadvantage” (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008, p. 493). Schwindt-Bayer (2018) 
proposed a different cause of the political gender gap, albeit when investigating female 
political representation particularly in Latin America. She states that the explanation for 
differences in political representation are due to institutional and political factors rather than 
cultural or socioeconomic factors.  
 
When investigating the economic and educational aspects of gender equality, both Jensen 
(2010) and Munshi & Rosenzweig (2006) draws their conclusions from case studies in India. 
On the other hand, when trying to find explanations for female political representation, 
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Schwindt-Bayer (2018) solely focus on Latin American countries. These results have not been 
fully evaluated on an international level. Iversen & Rosenbluth (2006 & 2008) gave some 
indications, but especially due to the limitations of the sample in their 2006 study, further 
contributions to the international level is required.  
 
1.4 Other important research 
1.4.1 The link between economic development and gender equality and 
the impact of culture and religion 
Eastin & Prakash (2013) found that GDP per capita had a cubic relationship with gender 
equality. Having higher levels of GDP per capita proved to increase gender equality but they 
also found that gender equality can stagnate or even decrease when GDP per capita is around 
$8 000-10 000. One explanation to why this is the case could be that, according to Inglehart, 
Norris & Welzel (2002), increasing GDP levels are likely to produce changes in the culture 
and an increasing democratization. They studied 65 countries from around the world, between 
1980 and 1999, and found that gender equality is correlated with a country’s level of 
democracy. Democratic countries tend to have a higher level of gender equality, although 
democratic institutions are not a guarantee for equality by themselves. Inglehart et al. (2002) 
also argue that democratic institutions could be seen as more of a consequence of a broader 
cultural change induced by economic growth. However, culture and norms change slowly. A 
study of the responses in three waves of the World Value Survey, Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
concludes that the historical religious heritage of a nation has been shaping some traditional 
values and norms that still persevere, regardless of the development. The development also 
seems dependent of the religious heritage; societies experience different outcomes from 
economic development partially due to religious heritage.  
 
Considering these studies GDP per capita, each country’s major religion and Freedom 
House’s (2018a) measure for level of democracy and civil liberties are included in the 
analysis. Further motivation of these variables is presented in section 3.2.  
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1.4.2 How dependency of children and elders impact work 
opportunities 
Breunig, Weiss, Yamauchi, Gong, and Mercante (2011) found a statistically significant 
relationship between reported difficulties with access to child care and women working less 
hours and having a less probability of working at all. In a paper about job equality for 
mothers, Frug (1979) described the situation as follows, “Child care has been an 
unacknowledged cost in our traditional economic policies, largely because women have 
provided these services free to the male wage earners.” (Frug, 1979, p. 101). In line with 
Breunig et al.’s (2011) conclusions, Frug (1979) too argues that one of the main actions to 
take, in order to make more mothers participate in the workforce, is to increase the availability 
of child care. This relationship is highlighted, although with different wording, by Kilic, 
Palacios-López and Goldstein (2015) when studying differences in gender specific 
productivity in agricultural work in Malawi; “The gender differences in returns to household 
size and child dependency ratio imply that the burden of childcare is more likely to reduce 
female agricultural productivity.” (Kilic, Palacios-López and Goldstein, 2015, p. 427) 
Sugawara & Nakamura (2014) studied how employment was affected by formal elderly care 
availability in Japan. They found that requirements to take care of elders had a negative 
relationship with the probability of women working regularly, and that non-regular workers 
more likely provided care themselves. 
 
These findings motivate the inclusion of age dependency ratios in the analysis, the motivation 
is elaborated in section 3.2.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
In this section, the theoretical framework of the paper is presented. The research question 
Does the size and composition of the female labor market affect educational-, health- and 
political dimensions of gender equality? comprises two separate parts, the effect of size and 
the effect of composition on the gender equality dimensions, and these two parts require 
separate hypotheses.  
2.1 Size of the female labor market and inequality 
In this paper, the size of the female labor market is defined as the percentage of women of 
working age (ages 15 to 64) that are employed outside the household, i.e. the female labor 
force participation rate. The main difference between being employed or not is the 
independent income received from employment. The independent income stream increases 
women’s own economic power. The increased economic power changes the dynamic of the 
household. More specifically, the relative bargaining power between women and men is 
changed. Iversen & Rosenbluth (2005) state that bargaining power comes from the ability to 
credibly walk away from a deal. An independent income should enhance this ability to walk 
away, since it provides options not possible without an own income. Richards et al. (2013) 
suggest a link between female household bargaining power and health and nutrition of girls. 
Lack of bargaining power leads to women being unable to adequately access medicine or 
health services which affects the health of their children as well as their own. 
The independent income is not only beneficial to the woman receiving it, but also to the 
household as the total income of the household increase. Rose (1999) found that girls 
mortality rates increased relative to boys during droughts in India, indicating that households 
favor boy’s welfare when there is not enough to feed everyone. This suggest that improved 
economic conditions are expected to be more beneficial for girls than boys given that 
conditions where tough to begin with. Rose (1999) also found that the ability to save for bad 
times proved to reduce the gap in mortality between girls and boys during droughts. The same 
could be possible with schooling. For example, if a household has bad economic conditions 
and are faced with the decision to choose whether their son or daughter should attend school, 
they are more likely to choose their son if future labor market opportunities for women are 
much worse than for men. When economic conditions are better, they no longer have to face 
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this choice; and if labor market opportunities are equal, when faced with this choice, the 
likelihood of choosing their daughter is equal to that of their son.  
The effect of the size of the female labor market on educational equality and health equality 
seem quite clear, and regarding political equality Blumberg (1984) suggests that increasing 
economic power for women in general may increase political equality through increasing 
female influence. Thanks to increasing economic power women gain more control over their 
lives and decisions, thus gaining influence in the household decision-making and 
subsequently also gaining influence on a societal level when women in general have more 
economic power. This societal increase in female economic power and influence may in turn 
have a positive effect on political equality. 
Our prediction is that educational, health and political equality will increase when female 
labor force participation increase.  
2.2 Composition of the female labor market and inequality 
We define the composition of the female labor market as the service, industry and 
agricultural sector. The three sectors denote where women are employed in a country, as 
shares of the total number of employed women. For example, 20% of all women work in 
service, 10% in industry and 70% in agriculture; together making up all 100% of the 
employed women in the country.   
The effects of increasing the female service sector, compared to the other sectors, will be the 
focus of this paper. Goldin (1995) states that as the female service sector grows, the 
opportunities of education for women increases as well. Furthermore, Eastin & Prakash 
(2013) suggest that the growth of the service sector should self-reinforce educational growth 
since the service sector allows for career advancement through education. Also, when 
countries develop economically, attitudes towards gender roles and equality shift. The most 
gains in gender equality happen when most of all workers are employed in the service sector, 
i.e. when the society is post-industrialized. (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). 
When considering productivity then service employment, opposed to agricultural- and 
industrial employment, favors cognitive abilities over physical abilities. On average, men are 
physically stronger than women. Thus, assuming that productivity is at least one variable of 
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wage-setting, the gender wage gap should be smaller in the service sector compared to the 
other sectors, since the productivity advantage of being physically strong does not apply to 
that sector. Relative economic power for women is thereby better and gender equality 
improves through the same mechanisms discussed earlier, in section 2.1. 
Our prediction is that educational, health and political equality will increase when the female 
service sector grows, and we expect educational equality to increase the most because of the 
self-reinforcing mechanism of service sector jobs. 
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3 Data 
In this section, the sample is described, and the variables are presented.  
3.1 Sample, main indicators and regressors 
The sample consists of 84 low- and middle-income countries, defined as countries with a GNI 
per capita of $12 235 or below (World Bank Group 2018a). The countries in the sample still 
have a labor market with a larger share of agricultural and industrial jobs, as well as lower 
female labor force participation, than the average for high-income countries. Considering this, 
as well as the conclusions of previous research, drawn mainly from low- and middle-income 
countries, high-income countries are excluded from this paper. The full list of sample 
countries can be found in appendix A. Yearly averages for labor force participation and 
employment in service for the sample countries and high-income countries can be found in 
appendix B and C.  
The data span a period of 11 years, from 2006 to 2016, the years when the Global Gender Gap 
Index has been produced. 2017 has been excluded due to the independent variables data for 
this year is solely projections.  
The chosen indicators of gender equality are three of the sub-indices from the Global Gender 
Gap Index. The sub-indices included are: Educational attainment, Health and survival, and 
Political empowerment. In table 1 the indicators of each the three sub-indices are reported. 
The index is focusing on the gaps in differences in resources available for women and men. 
The scores of both the main index and the sub-indices does not depend on the actual levels of 
resources, instead it rewards or penalizes based on the gaps in access to those resources. The 
index is bound, with a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound of 1. With a score of 1, gender 
parity has been achieved, and a 0 implies total imparity. However, if women would supersede 
men, the score is still 1 and no penalty or reward is given. Worth noting is that the benchmark 
levels used for determining the gaps have not changed, making historical comparisons 
credible (World Economic Forum, 2016). The indices are scaled by 100 to obtain coefficients 
that are more easily interpreted. 
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Table 1 Sub-index indicators 
Sub-index Indicators 
Educational  Ratio: female literacy rate over male value 
Attainment Ratio: female net primary enrolment rate over male value 
  Ratio: female net secondary enrolment rate over male value 
  Ratio: female gross tertiary enrolment ratio over male value 
Health and Survival Sex ratio at birth (converted to female-over-male ratio) 
  Ratio: female healthy life expectancy over male value 
Political  Ratio: females with seats in parliament over male value 
Empowerment Ratio: females at ministerial level over male value 
  
Ratio: number of years with a female head of state (last 50 years) over male 
value 
Source: World Economic Forum, 2016 
The sub-indices are calculated by using data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics; United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; World Health 
Organization; the Inter-Parliamentary Union as well as using data from World Economic 
Forum’s (2016) own database. The indicators of each sub-index are normalized by weighting 
the ratios by the 1% of the standard deviation of each indicator. By doing this, the indicators 
have the same relative impact on the score.  
The main independent variables in the analysis are female labor force participation (% of 
female population 15+) and female employment in service (% of female employment), both of 
which are collected from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2018a). 
The variables are modelled with estimates by ILO, International Labor Organization (2010), 
who compute their estimates by using their “Trends Econometric Models”. These models are 
used for imputing any missing data by running multivariate regressions for each country. 
According to the metadata from World Bank (2018b) ILO estimates are the best available for 
cross-country comparisons.  
The ILO divide the entire labor market into the three sectors; service, industry and agriculture. 
This means that the women not employed in service, work in either industry or agriculture, in 
line with our theoretical framework. To capture the effect of employment in the service 
sector, we define the composition of the female labor force as the percent of employed 
women who work in each sector, rather than the percent of workers in the sector who are 
women. Consider a small country with ten thousand workers employed in the service sector, 
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of which one thousand are women, and the other sectors employing one thousand workers, of 
which five hundred are women. Thus, the country has a total of one thousand five hundred 
female workers. The service sector would have 10% women and the others 50% if they were 
measured as the percent of all workers in the different sectors who are women. If the sectors 
instead are measured as percent of employed women, the size of the female service sector is 
66%, and the other sectors comprise of the remaining 33% of the female workforce. By using 
the first way of measuring the sectors, the percent of all workers who are women, we might 
be led to believe that having a large proportion of women, 50%, in the other sectors have an 
effect on gender equality, when instead it may be because the majority of employed women 
work in the service sector. With the latter way of measuring the female service sector, which 
gives 66%, we are be able to see if the fact that the majority of employed women are working 
in the service sector has an effect on gender equality, compared to the other sectors. 
 3.2 Control variables 
GDP/capita is included as a control variable based on Eastin & Prakash’s (2013) results. 
GDP/capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) is collected from the World Development 
Indicators database (World Bank Group 2018a).  
 
Additionally, in accordance with the findings of Inglehart, Norris & Welzel (2002), that 
democracy correlates with gender equality, political rights and civil liberties scores from the 
Freedom House democracy index (Freedom House, 2018a) are also included. This index is 
common to use in research papers in political science and economics (e.g. Barro, 1999). Both 
scores range from 1-7, where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free (Freedom House, 
2018b).  
 
A set of indicator variables for the major religions were downloaded from ARDA, the 
Association of Religion Data Archives, website (Association of Religion Data Archives, 
2011). The ARDA dataset derived from the 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom 
by The United States State Department (2008). The variables are included to control for the 
country-specific religious heritage which might affect the gender equality, in line with the 
conclusions of Inglehart and Baker (2000). The following changes have been made in the 
ARDA dataset; all Christian denominations (“Catholic”, “Orthodox Christian” and “Other 
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Christian”) have been merged to a single dummy variable, “Christian” 1. Five countries were 
listed as “Other” of which three were the Hindu majority countries, Mauritius, Nepal and 
India. They have been assigned a separate dummy variable, “Hindu”. The other two, 
Cameroon and Guyana, was marked as “Other” due to the population being divided into 
several of the Christian denominations used in the ARDA dataset, to clarify this, they were 
instead assigned to the “Christian” dummy variable. To avoid a dummy-variable trap 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009), one variable, a reference group, has to be omitted, and the rest of 
the variables will be compared to that reference group. Christian is the reference group in our 
model. 
Age dependency ratios for young and old will be included as proxies for the demand on 
working-aged household members to provide child- and elderly care. Generally, women are 
the ones taking care of dependents (i.e. children and elders) and thereby will have to work less 
or not at all (Breunig et al. 2011; Kilic, Palacios-López & Goldstein 2015). This makes it a 
likely covariate with labor force participation for women. The ratios are the quota between the 
dependents (young: < 15 years, old: > 64 years) and the working age population (15-64 years) 
(World Bank Group 2018a). The age dependency ratios are interpolations of data from 5-year 
intervals. These variables do not measure actual demand for care, but it is the closest proxy on 
a country level that could be found.  
  
                                                     
1 None of the Christian denominations were significant when using them separately in the regressions.   
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Table 2 Variables 
Variables Variable name Label 
  CountryName Country Name 
  Year   
Dependent 
variables EDU Global Gender Gap Educational Attainment Sub-index 
  HEA Global Gender Gap Health and Survival Sub-index 
  POL Global Gender Gap Political Empowerment Sub-index 
Main independent 
variables LFP 
Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 
15+)  
SER Employment in service, female (% of female employment) 
Control variables GDPpcPPP GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
  PR Political rights 
  CL Civil liberties 
  OADR Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) 
  YADR Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age population) 
  Christian Christian 
  Buddhist Buddhist 
  Hindu Hindu 
  Muslim Muslim 
3.3 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3 contains summary statistics of the time-averages. The 75th percentile of educational 
attainment says that 25 % of the values in the sample are above 99.394. Hence, a lot of 
countries already has close to or equal educational attainment. Health and survivability does 
not ever reach 100 but most observations are close, with a sample time-average of 97.079 and 
a standard deviation of 1.097. Political empowerment has the lowest mean value of the three 
dependent variables and is the most unequal dimension of gender equality in this paper.  
The sample mean of labor force participation is 52.093 %. For service employment the 
sample time-average is 53.729. Graphs showing the relationship between each index and 
labor force participation and employment in service are presented, with a time-averaged value 
for each country, in appendix D.  
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max P25 P75 P90 P95 
Educational 
attainment 
84 93.150 9.480 52.175 100.000 89.202 99.394 99.804 99.893 
Health and 
survivability 
84 97.079 1.097 93.441 97.976 96.769 97.913 97.967 97.967 
Political 
empowerment 
84 15.230 9.022 1.833 38.123 8.346 20.034 31.510 33.039 
Labor force 
participation 
rate, female 
84 52.093 16.474 13.218 85.565 43.848 62.834 75.289 80.567 
Share of 
employment in 
service 
84 53.729 24.074 3.309 95.418 33.305 72.409 84.073 86.936 
Notes: The mean values are the sampled time-average. The sub-index values are expressed on a scale of 0 to 100 and the 
main independent variables as percentages. The 25th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles are shown. 
The correlations of all variables except the religion dummies are presented in table 4. Service 
employment and GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) has a correlation of 0.64 which shows there 
is a connection between economic development and the share of employment in service. Other 
than that, there is relatively low correlations between the three dependent variables. This 
implies that there are almost no spillover effects between the indices.  
 
Table 4 Correlations 
  EDUSUB HEASUB POLSUB LFP SER GDPpcPPP PR CL OADR YADR 
EDU 1,00 
         
HEA 0,16 1,00 
        
POL 0,09 0,09 1,00 
       
LFP -0,23 -0,03 -0,01 1,00 
      
SER 0,58 0,36 0,00 -0,36 1,00 
     
GDPpcPPP 0,54 0,16 -0,12 -0,32 0,64 1,00 
    
PR -0,29 -0,25 -0,21 0,14 -0,38 -0,20 1,00 
   
CL -0,32 -0,26 -0,20 0,12 -0,39 -0,23 0,89 1,00 
  
OADR 0,41 0,04 -0,04 -0,20 0,30 0,57 -0,20 -0,25 1,00 
 
 YADR -0,71 0,02 0,06 0,40 -0,50 -0,70 0,18 0,21 -0,72 1,00 
Note: Pearson correlation. Religions not included since they are dummy-variables. 
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4 Empirical strategy 
In this section, the methods of analyzing are presented, along with the assumptions made and 
the advantages and disadvantages of our methods. This is followed by a section on how we 
intend to apply the methods to our dataset.  
4.1 Ordinary Least Squares regression 
To investigate the correlations between our dependent and independent variables, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regressions are carried out to find significance levels and marginal 
effects. These are made with the time-averaged data in two steps, first without any controls, 
and then with control variables to check the robustness of the estimates. The threshold of 
significant used is 5% (α=0.05). 
Model specification: 
?̅?𝑖  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1?̅?𝑖 + 𝛽2?̅?𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
?̅?𝑖 is a vector containing the time-average of each dependent variable. ?̅?𝑖 contains the time-
averages of the independent variables and Z̅i of the control variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved 
factor and is assumed to be standard normally distributed.  
Time-averages are useful to exclude short term fluctuations in the regressors and the 
dependent variables due to exogenous shocks such as boom-bust cycles or minor health 
epidemics. The main drawback in our case is that it would be susceptible to inconsistency 
because this method does not allow controlling for causes of country-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity. One variable, religious heritage is controlled for, but others, such as cultural 
differences or geographical characteristics are regarded as omitted variables that could cause 
inconsistencies when estimating the coefficients. For example, a country with suitable land 
for agriculture would naturally have a larger share of employment in that sector or cultural 
characteristics that promote women not working. Geography is regarded a time-invariant 
omitted variable. This is the case for culture as well, based on the conclusion of Inglehart et 
al. (2002) that cultures change slowly. 
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4.2 Panel regression using the fixed effects estimator 
To control for the time-invariant omitted variables, while still capturing the panel structure of 
the data, the fixed effects estimator is used. The fixed-effect estimation can be used since it 
allows for correlation between time-invariable omitted variables and the regressors. 
4.2.1 Basic assumptions 
First assumption: The error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡) should not be correlated with the regressors across all 
time periods for the fixed effects estimator to be unbiased. Correlation between the time 
constant variables and the regressors are allowed. 
Second assumption: Time-invariant variables cannot be included in the model because they 
become 0 in the fixed effects transformation (violation of the full rank assumption).  
Third assumption: The errors (𝜀𝑖𝑡) are required to be homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated.  
The first assumption is the basis for why the time-variant control variables are included. In 
order not to violate the second assumption, the religion control variables will not be included 
since they have time-invariant values. To account for violation of the third assumption, robust 
standard errors clustered within each country are used. The reason to believe this assumption 
is violated is because the data for educational attainment and health and survivability are 
close to its bound of 100, the variance will become lower as the index approaches 100 (see 
Section 5.1, table 3 and figures 1-2 for further illustration of this matter). Clustering the 
standard errors within each country allows for serial correlation within a country (Hoechle, 
2007), of which there is likely correlation. Using clustered standard errors can thereby relax 
the third assumption to only require uncorrelated errors between countries. 
4.2.2 Simple model specification 
To obtain the fixed effects estimator, the time-averaged value is subtracted from the 
individual value, making it the mean corrected value. (Gujarati & Porter 2009). A 
consequence of using the mean corrected values is that time-invariant variables are cancelled 
out.  
 
 
 21 
 
Model specification:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡  +  𝛼𝑖𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a vector consisting of our three dependent variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains the main independent 
variables and Zit the control variables, and 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved time-invariant variables. The 
error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is assumed to be standard normally distributed.  
Mean corrected model:  
              (𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝑍𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)  + (𝛼𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)  + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?)   
 𝛼𝑖𝑡 = ?̅?𝑖  ↔  𝛼𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡 =  0 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝑍𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)  +  (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?) 
 
Since the time-invariant variable, 𝛼𝑖𝑡, is constant over time, the mean equals the constant and 
the mean corrected value becomes 0. However, potential time-variant covariates still must be 
accounted for to avoid omitted variables bias. Therefore, all control variables of the fixed 
effects model are time-variant as the second assumption states.  
4.2.3 Disadvantages of estimating fixed effects 
It is advantageous to be able to disregard time-invariant variables when omitted variables 
such as culture or geographical traits could cause inconsistencies. However, at same time this 
means that some variation is removed, which could be a risk if the remaining variation is very 
low. Another consequence of the fixed effects estimation is that the long run components of 
that variable is removed (Asteriou & Hall 2007). This may be a problem if it takes more than 
one year for the real effects kick in. On the other hand, Jensen (2010) found improvements in 
gender equality in a study conducted over three years – which indicates that the effect is 
short- to mid-term and not long run. Therefore, a regression that includes our main 
independent variables with a lag of one year will be estimated to see if the effects labor force 
participation or sector employment are delayed. The fixed effects combined with the lagged 
variables may also weaken any objections regarding contemporary reverse causality, since it 
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is hard to argue that changes in the previous time period are caused by changes in the current 
time period.  
The World Bank (2018b) database does not contain data for all variables for all time units, a 
few countries do not have sub-index scores for each year due to data availability, and others 
lack some data for one of the control variables, this results in an unbalanced panel. Countries 
with missing values for all years is excluded from the analysis, while allowing countries with 
just a few missing observations to remain. This makes the panels highly- but not perfectly 
balanced. However, the fact that the panel is unbalanced does not necessarily become a 
problem, the important question is why the panel is unbalanced. If the reasons for the 
variables going missing are not related to the error term, εit i.e. unknown factors affecting 
gender equality sub-indices, the estimators will not be biased (Wooldridge, 2013).  
4.3 Testing the hypothesis 
Each dimension of gender equality will have its own regression. Thus, for each step of the 
analysis, three regressions are reported. The expected results according to the theoretical 
framework are the following: 
- The coefficient for labor force participation is positive for all dimensions of gender 
equality. 
- The coefficient for service employment is positive for all dimensions of gender 
equality; and the coefficient is larger for educational equality than the other indices. 
Service employment is the only sector variable added out of the three. Service employment is 
highly correlated with industry (r = -0.53) and almost perfectly correlated with agriculture (r 
= -0.96). Since the literature and our theoretical framework discuss the positive relationship 
between service employment and gender equality this is the only sector variable that will be 
used in the analysis. 
Also, interaction effects are added between labor force participation and service employment 
to see if the total effect on gender equality depends on the level of the interacted variables. By 
using interaction effects, the answer to the research question could be more nuanced, since the 
size and composition are not just evaluated as entities but also as combinations. The 
interaction variables are added in the same stage as the control variables are. To ensure the 
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model has a proper functional fit quadratic effect of the main independent variable will also 
be checked for in this stage of analysis. 
The emphasis in this paper will be put on the results of the fixed effects estimation since we 
believe it should provide the most consistent results. The main support for this statement is 
that fixed effects control for all time-invariant omitted variables, and that the hypothesis is to 
test time-variant variables effect on gender equality. 
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5 Results 
In this section, the results of the two methods are presented. Both are presented first without 
control variables and then with control variables added, to check the robustness.  
5.1 Time-averaged OLS 
In table 5 the time-averaged OLS-regressions without controls are presented. Labor force 
participation is not significant in any of the regressions. Service employment is significant and 
positive for the regressions on Educational attainment and Health and survivability. The 
interpretation is that if service employment increase by one percentage of female employment, 
then Educational attainment is increased by 0.231 points, and in the case of Health and 
survivability, the increase is 0.020 points. The effect on Educational attainment is more than 
11 times larger than the effect on Health and survivability. None of the variables are 
significant on Political empowerment. 
 
Table 3 Time-averaged-OLS-regression, no control variables 
  (1) (2) (3)  
 
Time-
averaged OLS 
Time-
averaged OLS 
Time-
averaged OLS  
VARIABLES EDU HEA POL  
         
LFP -0.007 0.007 0.017  
 (0.056) (0.007) (0.067)  
SER 0.231*** 0.020*** 0.001  
 (0.038) (0.005) (0.045)  
Constant 81.143*** 95.644*** 14.277***  
 (4.298) (0.565) (5.075)  
     
Observations 865 865 865  
R-squared 0.351 0.163 0.001  
Number of countries 84 84 84  
Standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
In table 6 the time-averaged OLS-regressions with controls are presented. Service employment 
remains significant and positive on Educational attainment and Health and survivability. The 
coefficients are somewhat larger than without the controls, but the ratio between them are 
roughly the same. Neither labor force participation nor service employment are significant on 
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Political empowerment. Quadratic effects were also tested for but yielded no significant 
result. See appendix E for the result.  
 
Labor force participation is significant and positive on Educational attainment. Also, the 
interaction effect between service employment and labor force participation is significant. 
The following conclusions can be drawn about the total effect of labor force participation and 
service employment: 
- The positive effect of increasing labor force participation is less positive if service 
employment is high than if service employment is low. 
- The positive effect of increasing service employment is less positive if labor force 
participation is high than if labor force participation is low. 
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Table 4 Time-averaged-OLS-regression, with control variables 
  (1) (2) (3)  
 
Time-
averaged OLS 
Time-
averaged OLS 
Time-
averaged OLS  
VARIABLES EDU HEA POL  
         
LFP 0.218** 0.002 -0.184  
 (0.083) (0.016) (0.141)  
SER 0.266*** 0.034** -0.112  
 (0.082) (0.016) (0.139)  
c.LFP#c.SER -0.005*** -0.000 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)  
GDPpcPPP 0.000 0.000 -0.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
PR -1.213 -0.118 -0.196  
 (0.968) (0.185) (1.632)  
CL 0.762 0.055 -1.162  
 (1.292) (0.247) (2.179)  
OADR -0.775*** 0.030 -0.121  
 (0.184) (0.035) (0.310)  
YADR -0.459*** 0.028** 0.018  
 (0.056) (0.011) (0.095)  
Buddhist -6.369** 0.464 -1.541  
 (2.706) (0.517) (4.561)  
Hindu -12.846*** -0.952 0.040  
 (3.431) (0.655) (5.783)  
Muslim -7.495*** -0.669* -7.178**  
 (1.826) (0.349) (3.078)  
Constant 117.293*** 94.474*** 36.626***  
 (7.127) (1.361) (12.013)  
     
Observations 845 845 845  
R-squared 0.756 0.336 0.190  
Number of countries 82 82 82  
Standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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5.2 Fixed effects 
Table 7 contains the results of the fixed-effects estimation without the control variables. 
Labor force participation is not significant in either of the regressions. Service employment is 
significant and positive on both Educational attainment and Political empowerment. The 
interpretation of the coefficients changes when estimating the fixed effects. Instead, the 
coefficients are now interpreted as follows; If service employment increase by one percentage 
past its time-average then Educational attainment increase by 0.114 points, and in the case of 
Political empowerment, the increase is 0.280 points.  
 
Table 5 Panel regression with fixed effects, no control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
VARIABLES EDU HEA POL 
        
LFP 0.083 0.022 -0.159 
 (0.103) (0.029) (0.200) 
SER 0.114*** 0.014 0.280*** 
 (0.037) (0.011) (0.103) 
Constant 82.661*** 95.172*** 8.388 
 (5.829) (1.662) (11.455) 
    
Observations 865 865 865 
R-squared 0.037 0.015 0.042 
Number of countries 84 84 84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The control variables are added to the fixed effects estimation and presented in table 8. 
Service employment has now lost its significance on Political empowerment. The Health and 
survivability regression remains as in table 7, with no significant main variables. The 
interaction effects are not significant in the fixed effects model. The use of lagged main 
independent variables, in case of delayed effects, yielded no notable differences. The table for 
the model with lagged variables is included in appendix F. 
 
A quadratic relationship between service employment and Educational attainment is found 
when the controls are added.  The effect is positive and diminishing as service employment 
 28 
 
increase. The total effect of service employment turns negative when service employment is 98 
percentages past its time-average.  
 
Table 6 Panel regression with fixed effects, with control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
VARIABLES EDU HEA POL 
        
LFP 0.302 0.051 -0.249 
 (0.194) (0.055) (0.313) 
SER 0.784*** 0.042 0.117 
 (0.238) (0.043) (0.318) 
SER2 -0.004*** -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
c.LFP#c.SER -0.005* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) 
GDPpcPPP 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PR -0.036 -0.066 -0.067 
 (0.255) (0.054) (0.434) 
CL 0.294 -0.033 0.194 
 (0.304) (0.105) (0.857) 
OADR -0.418* -0.118* -0.179 
 (0.232) (0.068) (0.743) 
YADR -0.267*** -0.020 -0.561*** 
 (0.074) (0.014) (0.161) 
Constant 78.116*** 95.837*** 50.942** 
 (13.967) (3.329) (23.332) 
    
Observations 845 845 845 
R-squared 0.212 0.043 0.168 
Number of countries 82 82 82 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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5.3 Discussion 
5.3.1 Interpretation of the results 
Regarding the first part of the research question, the size of the labor market, positive 
significant relationships between labor force participation and educational attainment were 
found in the time-averaged OLS. Also, the interaction effect was significant and because of 
that the level of service employment affects how large the effect of increasing labor force 
participation is going to be and vice versa. Other than that, no evidence suggests a 
relationship between neither labor force participation and health and survivability nor labor 
force participation and political empowerment. 
 
Once the fixed effects were estimated no significance between labor force participation and 
education attainment was found. The reason why could be that there is some omitted time-
invariant variable that affect both labor force participation and educational attainment 
positively. When this variable is removed because of the fixed effects, then the relationship 
between these variables also disappears because there is no direct connection between labor 
force participation and educational attainment. One variable that could explain this is 
attitudes toward gender roles. If the society has positive attitudes on women working, then 
society probably has the same attitude to women educating. As in the time-averaged OLS, no 
significant coefficients on the other indices was found in the fixed effects estimation which 
further indicates no relationship between labor force participation and the health and political 
dimension of gender equality. 
 
Continuing with the second part of the research question, the composition of the labor market. 
Significant positive coefficients of service employment on educational attainment and service 
employment on health and survivability were found. Service employment has a larger effect on 
educational attainment than on health and survivability when labor force participation is at a 
low level. If labor force participation is higher, then the total effect of service employment on 
educational attainment is lower because of the interaction effect. At 53.2 % labor force 
participation the marginal effect is 0 it becomes negative as labor force participation 
surpasses 53.2 %.  
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According to the fixed effects estimation, increasing service employment is most effective 
when it is starting to increase past its time-average, or if it is lower than its time-average. The 
interaction effect is no longer significant in the fixed effects estimation. Instead, the fixed 
effects estimation shows a quadratic relationship between service employment and 
educational attainment. The sample time-average for service employment is 53.729 % (table 
4). When service employment makes up 63.729 % (i.e. an increase of 10 percentages past the 
time-average) the marginal effects is 0.704 and at 83.729 % (i.e. an increase of 30 percentages 
past the time-average) the marginal effects is 0.544 and still considered to have a significant 
impact. Education attainment reaches a score of 100 when the share of service employment is 
87.658 % for the entire sample. These results are in line with our prediction, that educational 
opportunities increase as the service sector grows. The same positive relationship was also 
found in the research by Jensen (2010) and Munshi & Rosenzweig (2006). The marginally 
diminishing property of increasing the share of female employment in the service sector has 
not been brought up in previous literature. One explanation could be that with low initial 
levels of service sector employment, increases in the employment rate might spur literacy 
rates as well as primary- and secondary school enrolment due to educational requirements in 
the service sector, and also because the improved economic conditions makes it possible for 
parents to invest in their daughters. Later, when the service sector is more prominent, most 
women have primary and secondary schooling. Thus, the only remaining inequality is in 
tertiary education. Tertiary education may have more resistance due to higher costs of 
education and patriarchal norms in academia which leads to diminishing returns of increasing 
female service employment.  
 
From the fixed effects analysis, the conclusion is that if an individual country increases its 
service employment relative its own time-average, then the educational attainment index of 
that country is expected to increase relative to its time-average. Not to be confused with the 
interpretation of the time-averaged-OLS, where the interpretation is that if the time-averaged 
share of service employment increase, then the time-averaged score of educational attainment 
is expected to increase. The results aren’t comparable directly but since the fixed effects 
estimation is able to control for all time-invariant omitted variables; and service employment 
still held its significance on educational attainment, even when using a 1-year lag, this is the 
most reliable result of the analysis.  
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When the fixed effect where estimated, most coefficients lost its significance, indicating that 
some time-invariant omitted variable is the root cause of gender inequalities. Other scholars 
(Blackburn & Jarman, 2006; Oppenheimer, 1970) have argued institutional gender bias affect 
which type of positions that women entering the workforce end up in. If the positions 
available reflect the current gender inequalities, then neither female labor force participation, 
nor service employment, will have any effect on gender equality. Even if service employment 
has positive effects on gender equality in theory, it is not viable since women may end up in 
lower positions due to current gender bias.  
 
For political empowerment neither model yielded any significant results apart from the fixed 
effects without controls, but it proved not robust when the controls were added. The health 
and survivability index, before estimating the fixed effects, had significant coefficients for 
service employment. This suggests that either the low variation of health and survivability 
isn’t sufficient to estimate the fixed effects, or that some time-invariant variable is omitted. 
We treat the results regarding political empowerment as more reliable than health and 
survivability since the same dilemma, low variation versus omitted variable, is not suspected 
in that model. However, the results of the time-averaged-OLS suggest that the effects on 
health and survivability are marginally small and are regarded as not relevant to induce 
changes in the sub-index. 
5.3.2 Limitations 
The results may be affected to a large extent by the characteristics of the indices. The indices 
are continuous but are bound by 0 and 1 (0 and 100 after the transformation). While the 
political empowerment is not close any of the limits and can be viewed as completely 
continuous, some observations are in fact close to or equal to the upper limit for educational 
attainment and health and survivability. The OLS-estimation could then predict values that 
are technically impossible to attain. Also, the OLS-estimation could potentially miss out on 
valuable information by not being able to detect if there are some threshold where increasing 
employment simply doesn’t lead to higher equality. While a quadratic term may provide a 
good fit, it is not certain that is works well enough. This also causes problems when 
estimating the variance. When a country already has full equality, the index can’t increase 
 32 
 
further and will stay at 100. This could be worrying for the significant coefficient of service 
employment on educational attainment. Most values of educational attainment are close to or 
equal to 100, indicated by the 75th percentile being 99.394 points and the 90th being 99.804 
points (table 3). As the fitted line approaches 100 the variance becomes lower and lower 
because the observed values are bound by 100 making the variance lower due to the upper 
limit of the sub-index. The low variance could cause the standard error to be very small, even 
when using heterogeneity robust standard errors, and the significance test in turn isn’t 
reliable. 
 
Apart from limitations with the analysis, there are also general limitations with the sampled 
data and the interpretation. The most accurate conclusion about the research question would 
require a world of perfect information, with quantifiable household data. This is, naturally, 
not the case and this thesis is based on data consisting of estimates and country-level 
aggregates. Since the indices consist of ratios, any changes in those ratios might be due to, in 
absolute terms, worsening conditions for men instead of improving conditions for women. 
These ratios are in turn based on data collected mostly via surveys and censuses. This is also 
the case for our independent variables of interest, female labor force participation and female 
employment in service. This makes this data susceptible to measurement errors and different 
survey standards among the countries in the sample. Such differences are for example upper 
and lower bounds of age groups to include in the survey, or which reference period being 
used. Another lacking element of the data is the non-existence of reliable indicators of 
country specific policies, cultures and customs, all of which aren’t included in the indices. 
Also, the fact that we cannot be certain that the missing data is not correlated with any 
unobservable factors in turn affecting the gender equality indices, we cannot know if our 
coefficients are completely unbiased.  
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6 Conclusion 
From the research question, “Does the size and composition of the female labor market affect 
educational-, health- and political dimensions of gender equality?”, this paper has presented 
some evidence. Most of the results suggest no evidence for a connection between the size of 
the female labor market and gender equality. The one finding this paper provides is from the 
time-averaged OLS and is between labor force participation and the educational attainment 
index. Since the fixed effects estimation did not show the same relationship we have reason to 
believe that some time-invariant variable affected both labor force participation and the 
educational attainment index, resulting in a false positive relationship. Attitudes towards 
gender roles could explain this result, but it would have to be researched further to make any 
certain conclusions.  
 
A significant positive relationship between the share of female employment 
in service and educational where found, confirming both previous results from India (Jensen, 
2010; Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2006) using 84 low- and middle-income countries. In 
retrospect, this finding was the most probable considering the amount of previous research 
done. That the significant effect is not only positive but has a diminishing marginal return has 
not previously been found to our knowledge. Labor market policy focusing on increasing 
female service employment is the most effective in countries where the share of service 
employment is low. When service employment already is at a high level, then increasing it 
further would yield smaller improvements though the marginal effect can be shown not to 
diminish so quickly; and policy is still regarded as effective. Some indications about health 
equality where given in the time-averaged-OLS; seeing improvements 
when service employment increased. The effects where minor compared to the effects 
on Educational attainment, and if even if the time-averaged-OLS is viewed as reliable, 
intervention in this area would yield insignificant changes to health and survivability. From 
the beginning of analysis, the political empowerment sub-index showed no indication of 
being dependent on the female labor market. Compared to the health and survivability sub-
index, it is more likely that this result is reliable and not dependent on any mis-specified 
models. Thus, this study provides no evidence that supports labor market policy having any 
effect on political empowerment. 
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The most worrying limitation of the analysis is due to the indices being bound by 0 and 100. 
Further research should focus on either finding a better measurement of gender equality or 
exploring if methods using a different functional form better fitting to the indices to confirm if 
the results of this paper are in fact correct and not caused by this flaw. 
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Appendix A: Sample countries 
 
Country Income Group Region Major religion 
Albania Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Muslim 
Algeria Upper middle income Middle East & North Africa Muslim 
Angola Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Argentina Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Armenia Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Azerbaijan Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Muslim 
Bangladesh Lower middle income South Asia Muslim 
Belarus Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Belize Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Benin Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Bolivia Lower middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Botswana Upper middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Brazil Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Bulgaria Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Burkina Faso Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
Burundi Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Cabo Verde Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Cambodia Lower middle income East Asia & Pacific Buddhist 
Cameroon Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Chad Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
China Upper middle income East Asia & Pacific Buddhist 
Colombia Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Costa Rica Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Côte d'Ivoire Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Croatia Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Cuba Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Dominican Republic Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Ecuador Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
El Salvador Lower middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Ethiopia Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
Fiji Upper middle income East Asia & Pacific Christian 
Georgia Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Ghana Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Guatemala Lower middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Guyana Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Honduras Lower middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
India Lower middle income South Asia Hindu 
Indonesia Lower middle income East Asia & Pacific Muslim 
Jamaica Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Jordan Lower middle income Middle East & North Africa Muslim 
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Kazakhstan Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Kenya Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Kyrgyz Republic Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia Muslim 
Lebanon Upper middle income Middle East & North Africa Muslim 
Lesotho Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Madagascar Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Malawi Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Malaysia Upper middle income East Asia & Pacific Muslim 
Maldives Upper middle income South Asia Muslim 
Mali Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
Mauritania Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
Mauritius Upper middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Hindu 
Mexico Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Moldova Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Mongolia Lower middle income East Asia & Pacific Buddhist 
Morocco Lower middle income Middle East & North Africa Muslim 
Mozambique Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Namibia Upper middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Nepal Low income South Asia Hindu 
Nicaragua Lower middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Nigeria Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
Pakistan Lower middle income South Asia Muslim 
Panama Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Paraguay Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Peru Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Philippines Lower middle income East Asia & Pacific Christian 
Romania Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Russian Federation Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Senegal Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Muslim 
Serbia Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
South Africa Upper middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Sri Lanka Lower middle income South Asia Buddhist 
Suriname Upper middle income Latin America & Caribbean Christian 
Syrian Arab Republic Lower middle income Middle East & North Africa Muslim 
Tajikistan Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia Muslim 
Tanzania Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Thailand Upper middle income East Asia & Pacific Buddhist 
Tunisia Lower middle income Middle East & North Africa Muslim 
Turkey Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia Muslim 
Uganda Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Ukraine Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia Christian 
Vietnam Lower middle income East Asia & Pacific Buddhist 
Zambia Lower middle income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
Zimbabwe Low income Sub-Saharan Africa Christian 
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Appendix B: Average values for labor force participation 
and employment in service, sample countries 
 
 41 
 
Appendix C: Average values for labor force participation 
and employment in service, high-income countries 
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Appendix D: Sub-index graphs, time-averaged country 
values 
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Appendix E: Time-averaged-OLS, with quadratic effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Time-
averaged OLS 
Time-
averaged OLS 
Time-
averaged OLS 
VARIABLES EDU HEA POL 
        
LFP 0.255*** 0.004 -0.282* 
 (0.090) (0.017) (0.149) 
SER 0.476** 0.047 -0.666* 
 (0.206) (0.040) (0.342) 
SER2 -0.002 -0.000 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
c.LFP#c.SER -0.006*** -0.000 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
GDPpcPPP 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PR -1.271 -0.122 -0.044 
 (0.968) (0.186) (1.610) 
CL 0.844 0.060 -1.377 
 (1.292) (0.249) (2.150) 
OADR -0.791*** 0.029 -0.077 
 (0.184) (0.035) (0.306) 
YADR -0.448*** 0.028** -0.011 
 (0.057) (0.011) (0.095) 
Buddhist -6.823** 0.435 -0.344 
 (2.731) (0.526) (4.544) 
Hindu -12.141*** -0.908 -1.820 
 (3.483) (0.670) (5.793) 
Muslim -7.871*** -0.693* -6.187** 
 (1.854) (0.357) (3.084) 
Constant 111.501*** 94.106*** 51.898*** 
 (8.809) (1.696) (14.654) 
    
Observations 845 845 845 
R-squared 0.760 0.338 0.225 
Number of countries 82 82 82 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
  
 45 
 
Appendix F: Panel regression with fixed effects, with 
lagged main regressors 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
VARIABLES EDU HEA POL 
        
L.LFP 0.325 0.005 -0.170 
 (0.214) (0.058) (0.311) 
L.SER 0.741*** 0.010 0.019 
 (0.257) (0.044) (0.287) 
L.SER2 -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
cL.LFP#cL.SER -0.005* 0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) 
GDPpcPPP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PR 0.034 -0.041 -0.066 
 (0.239) (0.048) (0.414) 
CL 0.267 -0.039 -0.258 
 (0.317) (0.114) (0.862) 
OADR -0.404* -0.106 0.008 
 (0.222) (0.066) (0.774) 
YADR -0.262*** -0.026* -0.525*** 
 (0.079) (0.015) (0.167) 
Constant 77.966*** 98.446*** 46.059* 
 (15.140) (3.340) (23.290) 
    
Observations 780 780 780 
R-squared 0.182 0.039 0.133 
Number of countries 82 82 82 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
